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1Secure Transmission for Interference Networks:
User Selection and Transceiver Design
Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, Qiuyi Cao, Guan Gui, Senior Member, IEEE, Yang Cao, Shun Zhang,
Yunfei Chen, Senior Member, IEEE and Hikmet Sari, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Interference is usually regarded as a detrimental
factor that degrades the performance of a wireless network. How-
ever, when it is used properly, the security of transmission can be
effectively improved. In this paper, user selection and transceiver
design are proposed to guarantee the secure transmission in
a multiple-input multiple-output interference network with an
eavesdropper. First, user selection is performed to select the most
suitable user to transmit confidential information according to
the topology and path loss in each time slot among all users.
Then, based on user selection, the transceivers of the users are
jointly designed to maximize the secrecy rate of the selected
user while guaranteeing a minimum transmission rate for other
users. Due to the non-convexity of the optimization problem,
it is transformed into a convex second-order cone programming
with the help of successive approximations. An alternate iteration
algorithm is proposed to obtain the optimal solution. The fairness
of the user selection is considered, and a modified scheme is
proposed to share the opportunity of secure transmission among
users. Finally, simulation results are presented to show the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Interference networks, multiple-input multiple-
output, physical layer security, secrecy rate, transceiver design,
user selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, 5G has become the main focus of wireless com-
munications. It aims to achieve higher data rate, lower latency,
more connections and better quality of service (QoS) [1],
[2]. Due to the broadcasting nature of the wireless channel,
secure transmission is always a challenge for mobile networks,
especially 5G [3]. On the other hand, as massive connections
are required for Internet of Things in 5G networks, severe
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interference among users will degrade the system performance
seriously. This needs to be properly solved in order to guar-
antee the QoS [4]. On the other hand, if interference can be
properly managed and controlled, it can actually benefit 5G
networks, especially for the secure transmission [5].
When some potential eavesdroppers exist to wiretap the
confidential message in the legitimate wireless networks, the
security of transmission will be at risk [6]. Conventional anti-
eavesdropping methods usually entrust the cryptography in
the upper layer, which may endure heavy signal overhead
and cause latency [7]. Recently, physical layer security has
emerged as a promising solution to protecting the wireless
transmission [8], [9]. In Wyner’s landmark work, a discrete and
memoryless channel subject to wiretap was described, and the
conclusion was drawn that perfect secrecy rate can be nearly
achieved in his hypothetical encoder-decoder wiretap channel
model [10].
Following this pioneering research, extensive explorations
have been conducted on the physical layer security in wireless
networks, especially in the last decade [11]–[22]. In [11],
a joint beamforming and jamming scheme was proposed by
Wang et al., to disturb the potential eavesdropping in a two-
way relay network with single antenna. Some fundamental
work was done on jointly optimizing the information and
jamming beamforming by Zhu et al. in [12], to guarantee
both the transmit and receive security for a full-duplex base
station. In [13], Li and Ma designed an artificial noise (AN)
aided secure transmission scheme for a multiple-input single-
output (MISO) channel with multiple eavesdroppers. Shu et
al. proposed two effective schemes in [14] to guarantee the
secure transmission for directional modulation networks with
the help of secure multicast precoding. In [15], the secrecy
outage probability was analyzed in a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) network over Nakagami-m channels by Lei
et al., in which transmit antenna selection is performed to
improve the security performance. Fan et al. analyzed the
impact of cochannel interference on the secure transmission in
[16], in which the secrecy information was transferred to the
destination via several relays. In [17], Bi and Chen proposed
a novel new cooperative jamming scheme, in which a full-
duplex jammer was adopted to disrupt the eavesdropping with
the power supply from energy harvesting. The secrecy outage
probability was derived by Fan et al. in the secure cooperative
networks via using outdated relay selection [18]. In [19], the
transmit beamforming was optimized by Zhu et al. for secure
transmission of full-duplex networks with self-interference
mitigation. The transceiver design was performed by Kong et
2al. in [20] to guarantee the secure transmission via minimum
total mean-squared error criterion in interference networks. In
[21], Zhou et al. proposed an AN-aided cooperative jamming
scheme with wireless energy harvesting. Some excellent work
was done by Cai et al. in [22] on jointly transceiver design to
guarantee the secure transmission in a MIMO relay system.
On the other hand, the performance of secure transmission
in multi-user networks can be guaranteed, if the interference
can be properly managed and controlled, through which it
can become beneficial [23]–[27]. In [23], Chen and Zhang
proposed mode selection to guarantee the security of infor-
mation transmission in MU-MIMO downlink networks. A
tradeoff was made between a smaller number of accessing
users to avoid high interference among users and a larger
number of accessing users to generate strong interference to
disrupt the eavesdropping. In our previous works, interference
alignment (IA) was adopted to exploit the interference to
achieve secure transmission [24]–[26]. In [24], two IA-based
anti-eavesdropping schemes were proposed to guarantee the
secure transmission via zero-forcing or AN, respectively, with
or without the eavesdropping channel state information (CSI).
In [25], beneficial jamming was leveraged via IA to protect the
security of legitimate interference networks. However, the per-
formance of IA is not optimal, due to the fact that interference
alignment does not maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR). When the transceivers are jointly optimized
in interference networks, better performance can be achieved.
In [26], an AN-assisted IA scheme was proposed to guarantee
the secure transmission of interference network, in which the
AN is also utilized for wireless power transfer. In [27], two
schemes were proposed to guarantee the secrecy rate of the
primary user with the help of secondary users in cognitive
radio networks, by using optimal transceiver design and IA,
respectively. In the research, the key features of these two
interference management techniques were also demonstrated.
Based on the above observations, in this paper, the per-
formance of secure transmission for interference networks is
guaranteed through using user selection and transceiver design.
The eavesdropping towards the secure user is disrupted by the
interference from other users. The main contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows.
 User selection a kind of opportunistic communications
[28], and it is performed in an interference network with
multiple users, in which the most suitable user can be
chosen to perform secure transmission in each time slot
with the existence of an adversarial eavesdropper. To
reduce the complexity of user selection effectively, a
suboptimal scheme is proposed that only uses the distance
information between the nodes in the network.
 Based on user selection, the legitimate transceivers are
jointly designed to disrupt the eavesdropping, through
which the secrecy rate of the secure user is maximized,
with the rate threshold of other users guaranteed. This
optimization is difficult to solve due to its non-convexity.
Thus, an alternate optimization algorithm is proposed to
calculate suboptimal solutions with lower complexity.
 In the proposed user selection scheme, the secure user
may always be the same if the network topology does
Fig. 1. Demonstration of the secure transmission in MIMO interference
networks via user selection and transceiver design.
not change, which is unfair among users. Accordingly, a
modified user selection scheme is proposed considering
the fairness, to give all the legitimate users the opportuni-
ty of secure transmission. To further measure the fairness
of these schemes, Jain’s index is adopted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is presented. In Section III, the secure
user selection scheme is proposed. Based on user selection, the
joint optimal transceiver design is proposed in Section IV, with
its low-complexity algorithm derived. In Section V, a modified
user selection scheme is designed to improve the fairness
among users. Simulation results are presented in Section VI,
followed by the conclusions in Section VII.
Notation: CMN is the space of complex M N matrices.
CN (a;A) represents the complex Gaussian distribution, where
a and A are the mean and covariance matrices, respectively.
Re fg denotes the real operator and E() is the expectation.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this paper, a MIMO interference network with K + 1
users is considered with an eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 1.
Assume that Mt, Nr and Ne antennas are equipped at each
transmitter, each receiver, and the eavesdropper, respective-
ly. To guarantee the secure transmission for the legitimate
network, a specific user is selected to transmit confidential
information in each time slot, denoted as the secure user
(SeU), with the help of all the other K legitimate users (LeUs)
as jamming signals. Thus, all the users in the network can
have the opportunity to perform secure transmission within
multiple time slots. The distance from the transmitter to its
corresponding receiver is assumed to be equal for convenience.
The path loss of all channels is given by
 = d ; (1)
where d denotes the distance between the transceivers, 
represents the path loss exponent, and  is the path loss at
unit distance.
Thus, the decoded signal at the SeU receiver can be ex-
pressed as
yD=
p
DSuyDHDSvSxS+
KX
k=1
q

[k]
D u
y
DH
[k]
D v
[k]
B x
[k]+uyDnD; (2)
where xS and x[k] are the transmitted signal from the SeU
and the kth LeU with unit power, respectively. vS 2 CMt1
3and v[k]B 2 CMt1 are the precoding vectors of the SeU and
the kth LeU, respectively, with transmit power kvSk2 = PS
and
v[k]B 2 = P [k]. uD 2 CNr1 is the unitary decoding
vector at the SeU. HDS 2 CNrMt and H[k]D 2 CNrMt
represent the small-scale Rayleigh fading channel matrices
from the SeU transmitter and the kth LeU transmitter to the
SeU receiver, respectively, each entity of which is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian following
CN (0; 1). DS and [k]D represent the path loss from the SeU
transmitter and the kth LeU transmitter to the SeU receiver,
respectively, according to (1). The additive white gaussian
noise (AWGN) vector at the SeU receiver can be expressed as
nD 2 CN
 
0; 2DINr

.
Then, the decoded signal at the receiver of the kth LeU can
be presented as
y[k]B =
q

[kk]
B u
[k]y
B H
[kk]
B v
[k]
B x
[k] +
q

[k]
S u
[k]y
B H
[k]
BSvSxS
+
XK
j=1;j 6=k
q

[kj]
B u
[k]y
B H
[kj]
B v
[j]
B x
[j] + u[k]yB nB ; (3)
where u[k]B 2 CNr1 is the unitary decoding vector at the
kth LeU. H[kj]B 2 CNrMt and H[k]BS 2 CNrMt denote the
small-scale Rayleigh fading channel matrices from the jth LeU
transmitter and the SeU transmitter to the kth LeU receiver,
respectively. [k]S and 
[kj]
B are the path-loss gain from the SeU
transmitter and the jth LeU transmitter to the kth LeU receiver,
respectively. nB 2 CN
 
0; 2BINr

is the AWGN noise vector
at the kth LeU receiver.
In addition, the decoded signal at the eavesdropper can be
written as
yE=
p
ESuyEHESvSxS+
KX
k=1
q

[k]
E u
y
EH
[k]
E v
[k]
B x
[k]+uyEnE : (4)
where uE 2 CNe1 denotes the unitary decoding vector at the
eavesdropper. HES 2 CNeMt and H[k]E 2 CNeMt are the
small-scale Rayleigh fading channel matrices from the SeU
transmitter and the kth LeU transmitter to the eavesdropper,
respectively. ES and 
[k]
E represent the path-loss gain from the
SeU transmitter and the kth LeU transmitter to the eavesdrop-
per, respectively. nE 2 CN
 
0; 2EINe

is the AWGN noise
vector at the eavesdropper.
From (2), the received SINR at the SeU receiver can be
expressed as
SINRD =
DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D +
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2 : (5)
Also, from (3), the received SINR at the kth LeU receiver can
be described as
SINR[k]B =

[kk]
B
u[k]yB H[kk]B v[k]B 2
2B+
[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS2+ KP
j=1;j 6=k

[kj]
B
u[k]yB H[kj]B v[j]B 2: (6)
In addition, from (4), the received SINR at the eavesdropper
towards the SeU can be written as
SINRE =
ES
uyEHESvS2
2E +
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2 : (7)
From (5), the transmission rate of the SeU can be expressed
as
RD = log2 (1 + SINRD)
= log2
0B@1 + DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D +
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2
1CA : (8)
The eavesdropping rate can be derived from (7) as
RE = log2 (1 + SINRE)
= log2
0B@1 + ES
uyEHESvS2
2E +
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2
1CA : (9)
Thus, the secrecy rate of the SeU can be defined as the
difference between its transmission rate and the eavesdropping
rate as
RS = (RD  RE)+
=
0BBBBBBBB@
log2
1 +
DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D +
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2
1 +
ES
uyEHESvS2
2E +
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2
1CCCCCCCCA
+
: (10)
where ()+ , max(0; ). In this paper, user selection and
transceiver design will be performed to guarantee the secure
transmission of the SeU with the help of LeUs.
III. USER SELECTION FOR SECURE TRANSMISSION
To guarantee the secure transmission in MIMO interference
networks, user selection and transceiver design should be
jointly optimized to achieve the optimal performance. This is a
mixed-integer non-convex problem. To do this, user selection
should be performed K+1 times based on transceiver design
when exhaustive search is utilized, i.e., the transceiver design
should be optimized K + 1 times to obtain the optimal
selection. In Section IV, we will show that the computational
complexity of transceiver design is relatively high, and thus,
the overall computational complexity of this direct exhaustive
search is K+1 times of that for the transceiver design, which
may not be suitable for practical utilization.
In practical systems, path loss will cause severe performance
degradation, which is a key factor that affects user selection.
Therefore, user selection and transceiver design are separated,
and a suboptimal user selection scheme is proposed only
based on the path-loss information, which is much easier to
implement. By doing so, the overall computational complexity
will be reduced to nearly 1K+1 of that when the user selection
and transceiver design are optimized jointly.
4To make user selection much easier to achieve, we assume
that the transmit power allocated to each LeU and SeU all
equals to PT . Thus, we have E
huyHv2i = PT , which has
been proved in [29]. Based on this assumption, according to
(8), the transmission rate of SeU can be approximated as
RD = log2
 
1 +
PT DS
2D + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
!
: (11)
Similarly, according to (9), the eavesdropping rate at the
eavesdropper can be approximated as
RE = log2
 
1 +
PT ES
2E + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
!
: (12)
Thus, the secrecy rate for the SeU can be approximated as
RS =
 
RD   RE
+
= log2
0BBB@
1 +
PT DS
2D + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
1 +
PT ES
2E + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
1CCCA : (13)
To select the optimal user, the user with the highest secrecy
rate should be chosen as SeU for secure transmission in the
current time slot. The objective function of the optimization
problem can be expressed as

 = argmax


RS
= argmax


0BBB@
1 +
PT DS
2D + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
1 +
PT ES
2E + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
1CCCA ; (14)
where 
 is the set containing available solutions for the user
selection.
The combinatorial optimization problem in (14) can be
further simplified with some reasonable approximations when
SINR is high or the noise power is small, as shown in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: When SINR is high and the noise power is
small, the optimization problem in (14) can be simplified as

 = argmax


DS
ES
PK
k=1 
[k]
EPK
k=1 
[k]
D
: (15)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: DS in (15) is assumed to be a constant as the
distance between each pair of transceiver is fixed. Thus, the
optimal user selection is determined by ES ,
PK
k=1 
[k]
E andPK
k=1 
[k]
D . Firstly, ES should be smaller, which means that
the distance between the SeU transmitter and the eavesdropper
should be longer to avoid eavesdropping. Secondly,
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
should be larger, due to the fact that the distance between
LeU transmitters and the eavesdropper should be shorter to
generate jamming signals to disrupt the eavesdropping. Lastly,PK
k=1 
[k]
D should be smaller, which means that the distance
between the LeU transmitters and the SeU receiver should be
longer to guarantee the QoS of secure transmission. There-
fore, this suboptimal user selection scheme can be achieved
with only the distance information between the nodes in the
network considered, which can achieve reliable performance
with extremely low computational complexity.
IV. JOINT OPTIMAL TRANSCEIVER DESIGN
In this section, the performance of secure transmission for
the SeU is optimized with the help of LeUs, via joint optimal
transceiver design. First, the problem formulation is presented,
and then an alternate iteration algorithm is proposed to solve
this non-convex problem.
A. Problem Formulation
After determining the SeU using user selection, we can
optimize the performance of secure transmission for the SeU
via joint optimal transceiver design for both the SeU and LeUs,
with the QoS of each LeU guaranteed and the constraint of
total transmit power for the legitimate network satisfied. The
optimization problem of the joint optimal transceiver design
can be expressed as
max
uD;vS ;u
[k]
B ;v
[k]
B
0BBBBBBBB@
log2
1+
DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D+
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2
1+
ES
uyEHESvS2
2E+
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2
1CCCCCCCCA
+
(16a)
s:t: SINR[k]B  lim; (16b)XK
k=1
v[k]B 2 + kvSk2  PA; (16c)u[k]B 2= kuDk2= 1; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (16d)
In (16), lim is the SINR threshold for each LeU, and PA is
the constraint on the sum transmit power of the legitimate
network. We should notice that the eavesdropping CSI is
known by the legitimate users, which can be achieved when
the eavesdropper is also a registered user of the network,
but cannot participate in the secure transmission. Similar
assumptions have also been made in many existing works [13],
[20], [27], [30]. uE is the decoding vector at the eavesdropper
that aims to maximize the received SINR of the signal from
SeU according to [31]. When uE is developed through other
methods at the eavesdropper, the eavesdropping rate will be
lower than that using the MAX-SINR method. Thus, the lower
bound to the secrecy rate for SeU can be achieved via (16).
We can observe that (16) is non-convex, which is difficult
to solve. In the following, we will transform the problem into
a convex one with some necessary approximations, and then
solve the problem by an alternate iteration algorithm.
B. Alternate Optimization
First, we optimize the precoding vector v of each user with
decoding vectors u fixed, which should satisfy jjujj2 = 1.
Furthermore, some auxiliary variables, i.e., SD  1 and SE 2
5(0; 1), are introduced to help the approximating. Consequently,
the problem (16) can be changed into
max
vS ;v
[k]
B ;SD;SE
log2SDSE (17a)
s:t: 1 +
DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D +
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2  SD; (17b)
1 +
ES
uyEHESvS2
2E +
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2 
1
SE
; (17c)

[kk]
B
u[k]yB H[kk]B v[k]B 2
2B+
[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS2+ KP
j=1;j 6=k

[kj]
B
u[k]yB H[kj]B v[j]B 2
 lim; (17d)XK
i=1
v[k]B 2 + jjvS jj2  PA; (17e)u[k]B 2= jjuDjj2= 1; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (17f)
The constraints (17b)-(17d) can be further rewritten as
2D +
XK
k=1

[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2  DS
uyDHDSvS2
SD   1 ; (18)
2E+ ES
uyEHESvS2 +XKk=1 [k]E uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2

2E +
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2
SE
; (19)
2B+ 
[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS2 +XKj=1; j 6=k [kj]B u[k]yB H[kj]B v[j]B 2


[kk]
B
u[k]yB H[kk]B v[k]B 2
lim
; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (20)
From (18)-(19), we can see that although the formulas on
both sides of the inequalities are convex, these two constraints
are still non-convex. Therefore, we can employ the first-order
Taylor expansions to make them convex. Lemma 1 is first
presented as follows.
Lemma 1 : For a specific quadratic-over-linear function
FA; (y; x) =
AyyyyA
x   , where A satisfies AA
y  0 and x 
 , we can use the first-order Taylor expansion as
FA; (y; x; y^; x^) =
2Re
n
y^yAAyy
o
x^    
y^yAAyy^
(x^   )2 (x   ): (21)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that the approximations will not break the feasibility of
the problem because Re
n
Ayy^y^yA
o
 Ayy^y^yA for complex
values.
By using the above transformation, the non-convex con-
straints (18) and (19) can be converted into convex ones.
Specifically, we define two auxiliary variables as
A1 =
h
uyDHDS
iy
; (22)
A2 =
h
uyEH
[k]
E
iy
: (23)
Furthermore, y can be substituted by the precoding vectors.
Thus, the right side of the constraint (18) can be expressed as
R1=DS
2642Re
n
v^ySA1A
y
1vS
o
S^D 1
  v^
y
SA1A
y
1v^S
S^D 1
2 (SD 1)
375: (24)
Similarly, the right side of the constraint (19) can be trans-
formed into
R2 = 
2
E
S^2E

2S^E   SE

+
XK
k=1

[k]
E242Re
n
v^[k]yB A2A
y
2v
[k]
B
o
S^E
  v^
[k]y
B A2A
y
2v^
[k]
B
S^2E
SE
35 : (25)
Thus, the constraints (18) and (19) can be transformed into
convex ones. To make it concise, we can also define
R[k]3 =
q

[kk]
B u
[k]y
B H
[kk]
B v
[k]
Bp
lim
; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K; (26)
 1 = R1   2D; (27)
 2 = R2   2E ; (28)
 3 = R[k]3 : (29)
Thus, the optimization problem (17), can be approximately
rewritten as
max
vS ;v
[k]
B ;SD;SE
SDSE (30a)
s:t:
XK
k=1

[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2   1; (30b)
ES
uyEHESvS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uyEH[k]E v[k]B 2 2;(30c)

[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS2+ KX
j=1;j 6=k

[kj]
B
u[k]yB H[kj]B v[j]B 2+2B 23;
(30d)
KX
k=1
v[k]B 2 + kvSk2  PA; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (30e)
We can observe that the objective function is still not con-
vex. Maximizing SDSE is equivalent to maximizing
p
SDSE ,
due to the fact that both of them are nonnegative. Therefore,
the problem (30) can be changed into
max
vS ;v
[k]
B ;SD;SE
t > 0 (31a)
s:t: t2  SDSE ; (31b)
(30b)  (30e): (31c)
6max
vS ;v
[k]
B ;SD;SE
log2 t (32a)
s:t:
[2t; SD   SE ]y  SD + SE ; (32b)

2
q

[1]
D juyDH[1]D v[1]B j; 2
q

[2]
D juyDH[2]D v[2]B j; : : : ; 2
q

[K]
D juyDH[K]D v[K]B j; 1   1
y   1 + 1; (32c)

2
p
ES juyEHESvS j; 2
q

[1]
E juyEH[1]E v[1]B j; : : : ; 2
q

[K]
E juyEH[K]E v[K]B j; 2   1
y   2 + 1; (32d)

2B ; 2
q

[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS ; 2q[k1]B u[k]yB H[k1]v[1]B  ; : : : ; 2q[kK]B u[k]yB H[k]B v[K]B y
  2 3; (32e)XK
k=1
v[k]B 2 + kvSk2  PA; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (32f)
It is worth noting that the constraints of (31) in the
form of x2  x1x2 can be converted into the form of[2x; (x1   x2)]y  x1+x2 by means of second-order cone
programming (SOCP), x1  0 and x2  0. Thus, we can
apply this transformation to (31), to give (32) on the top of
next page. The problem (32) is convex, which can be solved
through the existing toolboxes such as CVX easily.
Then, the decoding vector u of each user can be optimized
with fixed precoding vectors v, in which SE is a fixed value.
Thus, the optimization problem (16) can be changed into
max
uD;u
[k]
B ;SD
SD (33a)
s:t: 1 +
DS
uyDHDSvS2
2D +
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
uyDH[k]D v[k]B 2  SD; (33b)

[kk]
B
u[k]yB H[kk]B v[k]B 2
2B+
[k]
S
u[k]yB H[k]S vS2+ KP
j=1; j 6=k

[kj]
B
u[k]yB H[kj]B v[j]B 2
 lim; (33c)u[k]B 2 = jjuDjj2 = 1; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (33d)
By exploiting the SOCP, (33) can also be changed into a
convex one approximately, which can be solved by using
existing toolboxes such as CVX.
Thus, the suboptimal solutions of (16) can be calculated by
optimizing (32) and (33) alternately until convergence.
C. Proposed Alternate Optimization Algorithm
With all the derivations above, we can summarize the pro-
posed alterative optimization algorithm for (16) as Algorithm
1 based on SOCP, which is guaranteed to be convergent
according to [32]. Specifically, the value of t becomes larger
than or is equal to its previous value at each iteration. In
addition, due to the fact that the sum transmit power is
limited and the resource is allocated to LeUs to guarantee
their QoS, the secrecy rate has an upper bound. Therefore, we
can conclude that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge.
Algorithm 1 Alternate Optimization Algorithm for (16)
1: Start with initializing the number of iterations N and the
basic feasible values of network

v^S ; v^
[k]
B ; S^D; S^E ; lim

.
Set

u^D; u^
[k]
B

satisfying ku^Dk2 = 1 and
u^[k]B 2 = 1.
2: repeat
3: Solve the issue (32) by CVX and save the solutions
vS; v
[k]
B

; SD1
; SE

.
4: Solve the issue (33) with the initial values of the
previous step

vS; v
[k]
B

; SD1


by CVX and obtain
uD; u
[k]
B

; SD2


.
5: Update the elements

v^S ; v^
[k]
B ; u^D; u^
[k]
B ; S^D; S^E

=
vS; v
[k]
B

;uD; u
[k]
B

; SD2
; SE;

.
6: n = n+ 1
7: until n = N .
8: Output the solutions: v[k]B , vS , u
[k]
B and uD, k = 1; : : : ;K.
Remark 2: The number of antennas can affect the perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme. When the number of antennas
increases, more resource can be exploited to improve the
system performance, i.e., the secrecy rate of the SeU can
be further enhanced. On the other hand, when the number
of antennas decreases, the antenna resource will be limited,
and the performance will be degraded. In some extreme cases,
inadequate antennas can even make (16) unsolvable, i.e., the
SINR requirements for the LeUs in (16b) cannot be satisfied.
V. USER SELECTION WITH FAIRNESS
In Section III, low-complexity user selection scheme was
proposed to select the user with the maximum secrecy rate as
the SeU. However, if the relative locations do not change, the
results of the selection will not change either. This will result
in the unfairness among users. In order to give the opportunity
of secure transmission to all legitimate users, a modified
user selection scheme is proposed considering fairness in this
section. In addition, Jain’s index is adopted to measure the
fairness of the network.
7Fig. 2. Demonstration of the user selection scheme with fairness.
A. User Selection with Fairness
Considering fairness among users, we propose a modified
user selection scheme to guarantee the secure transmission of
interference networks, as shown in Fig. 2.
Assume that the transmission duration for each time slot is
T . For the current tth time slot, the secrecy throughput for the
kth user when selected as SeU during the last Nf time slots
can be expressed as
bT [k]S (t)= t 1X
j=t Nf
R
[k]
S (j)T; k=1; 2; : : : ;K+1; t>Nf : (34)
R
[k]
S (j) is the secrecy rate of the kth user at the jth time slot,
which equalled to 0 when it was selected as LeU in that time
slot. Based on (34), we can define a factor for the kth user as
[k](t)=
1bT [k]S (t)
1
K+1
K+1X
l=1
1bT [l]S (t)
=
1Pt 1
j=t Nf R
[k]
S (j)
1
K+1
K+1X
l=1
1
t 1P
j=t Nf
R
[l]
S (j)
; (35)
where [k](t) indicates the opportunity for the kth user to
be selected as the SeU in the tth time slot. When [k](t) is
larger, it means that the secrecy throughput of the kth user is
smaller in the last Nf time slots, and more opportunity should
be allocated to the kth user to perform secure transmission in
the current tth time slot.
Based on the above assumptions, the objective function for
the user selection scheme with fairness can be presented as
max
s1;s2;:::;sK+1
XK+1
k=1
R
[k]
S sk
[k] (36a)
s:t:
XK+1
k=1
sk = 1; (36b)
sk 2 f0; 1g; 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K + 1: (36c)
In (36), sk=1 represents that the kth user is selected as SeU
in the current time slot, while sk=0 implies the opposite. R
[k]
S
denotes the secrecy rate for the kth user that is calculated
according to the optimization (16) in the current time slot,
when the kth user is set as the SeU.
In our proposed user selection scheme with fairness in (36),
the optimization for secrecy rate and the secrecy throughput
in the last Nf slots for each user are jointly considered.
Thus, tradeoff can be made between the performance of
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on (15).
secure transmission and the fairness among users through our
proposed user selection.
B. Jain’s Index
To measure the fairness of the proposed user selection
scheme in (36) effectively, Jain’s index is adopted, which can
be presented as
J =
PK+1
k=1 T [k]S
2
(K + 1)
PK+1
k=1

T [k]S
2 ; (37)
where T [k]S is the secrecy throughput for the kth users in
the overall duration utilized to measure the fairness. It can
be observed that J ranges from 1=(K + 1) to 1 in (37).
J = 1=N refers to the least fair case, in which the secure
transmission is performed by only one user all the time, while
J = 1 stands for the fairest case, in which all the users
have equal opportunity to perform secure transmission. In this
paper, Jain’s index will be adopted to measure the fairness of
user selection in the simulation part.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the simulation, all users are randomly distributed in a 100
m100 m area, where the distance between each transmitter
and its corresponding receiver is set to be 10 m. For the
path-loss model, we set  = 2:6 and  = 0:0001 in (1).
The noise power at each receiver is set to be -110 dBm. We
set Mt = Nr = Ne = 5. To show the rate performance
much clearly, we will demonstrate the simulation with the
rate threshold instead of the SINR threshold, which can be
easily calculated as rlim = log2 (1 + lim). Without loss of
generality, the 1st user is assumed to be selected as the SeU
for secure transmission in the current time slot.
First, a 5-user interference network with one eavesdropper
is considered, whose topology is depicted as Fig. 3. From
the results, we can see that the 1st user is relatively far from
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Fig. 4. Convergence of Algorithm 1 for the joint transceiver design scheme
with different PA. rlim =2 bit/s/Hz.
the eavesdropper and other users, which means that other
users will not generate strong interference to the 1st user and
the received signal from the 1st user at the eavesdropper is
relatively weak. In addition, other users are all close to the
eavesdropper, which indicates that other users will generate
strong jamming signals at the eavesdropper to help the 1st
user achieve secure transmission. Thus, with all these factors
jointly considered, the 1st user can be selected as the SeU,
and all the others as LeUs, according to our proposed user
selection scheme in (15).
Then, the performance of the proposed joint transceiver
design scheme is analyzed based on the user selection scheme
in (15) in Figs. 4-7, with the topology depicted in Fig. 3. In
Fig. 4, the convergence of Algorithm 1 for the joint transceiver
design scheme is analyzed, with the rate threshold of each LeU
rlim equal 2 bit/s/Hz and different sum transmit power of the
legitimate network PA. From the results, we can see that the
proposed algorithm can converge rapidly, within 5 iterations.
In addition, we can also find that the secrecy rate of SeU will
increase when sum transmit power increases, due to the fact
that more resources can be allocated to improve its secrecy
rate.
In Fig. 5, the secrecy rate, eavesdropping rate and transmis-
sion rate of the SeU, and the transmission rate of all the LeUs,
are compared for different values of PA at rlim =2 bit/s/Hz.
From the results, we can observe that the transmission rate
of the SeU will increase with PA, while the eavesdropping
rate remains almost unchanged. Thus, the secrecy rate will
increase with PA with the help of all the LeUs. In addition, the
transmission rate of all the LeUs remains almost the same, i.e.,
2 bit/s/Hz, for different values of PA, which is consistent with
(16b). From the analysis, we can conclude that the LeUs will
satisfy their minimum requirements to save power to improve
performance of secure transmission for the SeU.
In Fig. 6, the secrecy rate, eavesdropping rate and trans-
mission rate of the SeU is compared for different values of
rlim at PA=20 dBm. From the results, we can see that the
transmission rate of the SeU will decrease with rlim, due to
the fact that more transmit power will be allocated to LeUs
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to satisfy their requirements, thus with less remaining for
the SeU. In addition, for the eavesdropping rate, it decreases
first, and then remains almost unchanged. This is because
larger rlim means higher transmit power for LeUs, which
will generate greater interference to disrupt the eavesdropping.
Furthermore, the secrecy rate of the SeU will first increase
and then decrease for the reason that increasing the transmit
power of the LeUs will first decrease the eavesdropping rate
obviously, which can make up the loss of the transmission rate
for the SeU. However, when the transmit power still increase
after rlim = 6 bit/s/Hz, the eavesdropping rate will decrease
very slowly, and thus, the transmission rate loss of the SeU
will result in the decrease of its secrecy rate.
In Fig. 7, the secrecy rate, eavesdropping rate and the
transmission rate of the SeU are compared with different
values of PA and rlim. From the results, we can see that
the transmission rate will increase with PA, with the eaves-
dropping rate almost unchanged. Thus, the secrecy rate of the
SeU will increase when PA increases. In addition, we can
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also observe that when rlim is changed from 2 bit/s/Hz to 4
bit/s/Hz, the eavesdropping rate will decrease, with little loss
in the transmission rate. Thus, the secrecy rate of the SeU
will increase when rlim changes from 2 bit/s/Hz to 4 bit/s/Hz,
which is consistent with the results in Fig. 6.
Furthermore, the performance of our proposed schemes for
more users are also analyzed in Figs. 8-9, i.e., 7 users. In
Fig. 8, the topology of the 7-user network with existence
of an eavesdropper is shown. From the results, we can see
that the 1st user is relatively far from the eavesdropper and
the other users, while the other users are all relatively near
the eavesdropper. According to the similar analysis in Fig. 3,
the 1st user can be selected as the SeU, with all the others
as LeUs, according to our proposed user selection scheme
in (15). In Fig. 9, the secrecy rate, eavesdropping rate and
the transmission rate of the SeU and the transmission rate of
the LeUs are compared with different values of PA, when
there are 7 users. rlim =2 bit/s/Hz. From the results, we can
see that the transmission rate of the SeU will increase with
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PA, with the eavesdropping rate almost unchanged. Thus, the
secrecy rate of the SeU will also increase with high PA. To
achieve this, the LeUs will satisfy the performance, with their
transmission rate just equal to rlim approximately. In addition,
the eavesdropping rate becomes lower compared to that in Fig.
5, which reflects that security performance becomes better
with more LeUs, due to stronger interference towards the
eavesdropping. Thus, our proposed scheme is also suitable for
dense networks.
To further guarantee the fairness of the user selection
scheme, the Jain’s index of the proposed user selection scheme
with fairness for a 5-user interference network during 200 time
slots is compared with different values of Nt and PA in Fig.
10. rlim =4 bit/s/Hz. From the results, we can see that when
user selection is performed without fairness according to (15),
Jain’s index is 0.2 with different values of PA, which means
that the least fairness can be achieved when a specific user
is always selected as the SeU, due to the fixed topology in
Fig. 3. On the other hand, the Jain’s index is close to 1 when
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the proposed user selection scheme with fairness in (36) is
adopted, which means that the fairness among users can be
guaranteed effectively when considering the fairness in user
selection. Furthermore, the Jain’s index will increase slightly
with Nt. The secrecy rate of the proposed scheme with and
without fairness is also compared in Fig. 11. From the results,
we can see that the secrecy rate will decrease when the fairness
among users is considered, although the Jain’s index can be
improved. Specifically, the secrecy rate will decrease slightly
with Nt. This is natural due to the fact that we should sacrifice
the secrecy rate for the fairness.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, user selection and transceiver design have been
proposed to guarantee the secure transmission of interference
networks. First, the most suitable user was selected as SeU
to perform secure transmission, with the help of the other
users as LeUs. To reduce its computational complexity, a
suboptimal user selection scheme was proposed only based on
the distance information between nodes. Based on the results
of user selection, the transceiver of the legitimate users were
jointly designed to maximize the secrecy rate of SeU, with
the rate requirement of LeUs guaranteed. The problem was
difficult to solve due to its non-convexity. Thus, an alternate
optimization algorithm was proposed via SOCP to calculate
its suboptimal solutions with low complexity. Furthermore,
to share the opportunity of secure transmission among all
the legitimate users, a modified user selection scheme was
proposed with the fairness fully considered. Finally, simulation
results were presented to show the effectiveness and efficiency
of the proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: When received SINR is high enough, we should
notice that
PT DS
2D + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
and
PT ES
2E + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
are
much larger than 1. Thus, 1 can be ignored in (14), which can
be changed into

 = argmax


0BBB@
PT DS
2D + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
PT ES
2E + PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
1CCCA : (38)
In addition, when the channel noise D and E are much
smaller than the received signal power, problem (38) can be
further simplified as

 = argmax


RS = argmax


PT DS
PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
D
PT ES
PT
PK
k=1 
[k]
E
; (39)
which can be simplified as (15).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: With respect to its two variables y and x, the first-
order Taylor expansion of F can be derived as
FA; (y; x; y^; x^)=A
yy^y^yA
x^   
Ayy^y^yA
(x^  )2 (x x^)+
2y^yAAy
(x^  ) (y y^): (40)
Substituting the equation Ayy^y^yA = y^yAAyy^ into (40), and it
can be rewritten as
FA; (y; x; y^; x^) = 2y^
yAAyy
x^    
y^yAAyy^
(x^   )2 (x   ): (41)
Due to the fact that Ayy^y^yA can be expressed as
Re
n
Ayy^y^yA
o
approximately, the first-order series expansion
(21) can be proved.
REFERENCES
[1] J. G. Andrews, S. Buzzi, W. Choi, S. V. Hanly, A. Lozano, A. C. K.
Soong, and J. C. Zhang, “What will 5G be?,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1065–1082, Jun. 2014.
[2] Z. Li, L. Guan, C. Li, and A. Radwan, “A secure intelligent spectrum
control strategy for future THz mobile heterogeneous networks,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 116–123, Jun. 2018.
[3] N. Yang, L. Wang, G. Geraci, M. Elkashlan, J. Yuan, and M. D. Renzo,
“Safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks using physical
layer security,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 20–27, Apr.
2015.
[4] W. Nam, D. Bai, J. Lee, and I. Kang, “Advanced interference manage-
ment for 5G cellular networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 5,
pp. 52–60, May 2014.
[5] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, M. Li, Q. Yan, and V. C. M. Leung, “Physical layer
security issues in interference-alignment-based wireless networks,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 162–168, Aug. 2016.
[6] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, X. Wang, and L. Hanzo, “A survey on wireless security:
Technical challenges, recent advances, and future trends,” Proc. IEEE,
vol. 104, no. 9, pp. 1727–1765, Sept. 2016.
[7] A. Khisti, “Secret-key agreement over non-coherent block-fading chan-
nels with public discussion,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 12,
pp. 7164–7178, Dec. 2016.
[8] Y. S. Shiu, S. Y. Chang, H. C. Wu, S. C. H. Huang, and H. H. Chen,
“Physical layer security in wireless networks: a tutorial,” IEEE Wireless
Commun., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–74, Apr. 2011.
[9] F. Zhu, F. Gao, H. Lin, S. Jin, J. Zhao, and G. Qian, “Robust
beamforming for physical layer security in BDMA massive MIMO,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 775–787, Apr. 2018.
11
[10] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[11] H.-M. Wang, M. Luo, Q. Yin, and X.-G. Xia, “Hybrid cooperative
beamforming and jamming for physical-layer security of two-way relay
networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens. Security, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 2007–
2020, Dec. 2013.
[12] F. Zhu, F. Gao, M. Yao, and H. Zou, “Joint information- and jamming-
beamforming for physical layer security with full duplex base station,”
IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 62, no. 24, pp. 6391–6401, Dec. 2014.
[13] Q. Li and W.-K. Ma, “Spatially selective artificial-noise aided transmit
optimization for MISO multi-eves secrecy rate maximization,” IEEE
Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2704–2717, May 2013.
[14] F. Shu, L. Xu, J. Wang, W. Zhu, and X. Zhou, “Artificial-noise-aided
secure multicast precoding for directional modulation systems,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 6658–6662, Jul. 2018.
[15] H. Lei, C. Gao, I. S. Ansari, Y. Guo, Y. Zou, G. Pan, and K. A. Qaraqe,
“Secrecy outage performance of transmit antenna selection for MIMO
underlay cognitive radio systems over Nakagami-m channels,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 2237–2250, Mar. 2017.
[16] L. Fan, X. Lei, N. Yang, T. Q. Duong, and G. K. Karagiannidis, “Secure
multiple amplify-and-forward relaying with cochannel interference,”
IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 1494–1505,
Dec. 2016.
[17] Y. Bi and H. Chen, “Accumulate and jam: Towards secure communi-
cation via a wireless-powered full-duplex jammer,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics
Signal Process., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 1538–1550, Dec. 2016.
[18] L. Fan, X. Lei, N. Yang, T. Q. Duong, and G. K. Karagiannidis, “Secrecy
cooperative networks with outdated relay selection over correlated fading
channels,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 66, no. 8, pp. 7599–7603,
2017.
[19] F. Zhu, F. Gao, T. Zhang, K. Sun, and M. Yao, “Physical-layer security
for full duplex communications with self-interference mitigation,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 329–340, Jan. 2016.
[20] Z. Kong, S. Yang, F. Wu, S. Peng, L. Zhong, and L. Hanzo, “Iterative
distributed minimum total MSE approach for secure communications
in MIMO interference channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 594–608, Mar. 2016.
[21] F. Zhou, Z. Chu, H. Sun, R. Q. Hu, and L. Hanzo, “Artificial noise aided
secure cognitive beamforming for cooperative MISO-NOMA using
SWIPT,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 918–931,
Apr. 2018.
[22] Y. Cai, Q. Shi, B. Champagne, and G. Y. Li, “Joint transceiver design for
secure downlink communications over an amplify-and-forward MIMO
relay,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 65, no. 9, pp. 3691–3704, Sept. 2017.
[23] X. Chen and Y. Zhang, “Mode selection in MU-MIMO downlink
networks: A physical-layer security perspective,” IEEE Syst. J., vol. 11,
no. 2, pp. 1128–1136, Jun. 2017.
[24] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, M. Li, and V. C. M. Leung, “Anti-eavesdropping
schemes for interference alignment (IA)-based wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 5719–5732, Aug. 2016.
[25] J. Guo, N. Zhao, Z. Yang, F. R. Yu, Y. Chen, and V. C. M. Leung,
“Proactive jamming toward interference alignment networks: Beneficial
and adversarial aspects,” IEEE Syst. J., Online, DOI: 10.1109/JSYS-
T.2017.2770174.
[26] N. Zhao, Y. Cao, F. R. Yu, Y. Chen, M. Jin, and V. C. M. Leung,
“Artificial noise assisted secure interference networks with wireless
power transfer,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 1087–
1098, Feb. 2018.
[27] Y. Cao, N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, M. Jin, Y. Chen, J. Tang, and V. C. M. Leung,
“Optimization or alignment: Secure primary transmission assisted by
secondary networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4,
pp. 905–917, Apr. 2018.
[28] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, and V. C. M. Leung, “Opportunistic communications
in interference alignment networks with wireless power transfer,” IEEE
Wireless Commun., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 88–95, Feb. 2015.
[29] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, and H. Sun, “Adaptive energy-efficient power
allocation in green interference-alignment-based wireless networks,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 64, no. 9, pp. 4268–4281, Sept. 2015.
[30] T. Lv, H. Gao, R. Cao, and J. Zhou, “Co-ordinated secure beamforming
in K-user interference channel with multiple eavesdroppers,” IEEE
Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 212–215, Apr. 2016.
[31] K. Gomadam, V. R. Cadambe, and S. A. Jafar, “A distributed numerical
approach to interference alignment and applications to wireless interfer-
ence networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 3309–3322,
Jun. 2011.
[32] A. J. Smola, S. V. N. Vishwanathan, and T. Hofmann, “Kernel methods
for missing variables,” in Proc. 10th Int. Workshop Artif. Intell. Stat.,
pp. 325–332, Barbados, Jan. 2005.
Nan Zhao (S’08-M’11-SM’16) is currently an Asso-
ciate Professor at Dalian University of Technology,
China. He received the Ph.D. degree in informa-
tion and communication engineering in 2011, from
Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China.
Dr. Zhao is serving or served on the editorial
boards of 7 SCI-indexed journals, including IEEE
Transactions on Green Communications and Net-
working. He won the best paper awards in IEEE
VTC 2017 Spring, MLICOM 2017, ICNC 2018,
WCSP 2018 and CSPS 2018. He also received
the IEEE Communications Society Asia Pacific Board Outstanding Young
Researcher Award in 2018.
Qiuyi Cao received the B.S. degree from Dalian
University of Technology, Dalian China. She is
currently studying towards the M.S. degree at the
School of Information and Communication Engi-
neering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian,
China. Her current research interests are mainly
focus on physical layer security.
Guan Gui (M’11-SM’17) received the Dr. Eng
degree in Information and Communication Engi-
neering from University of Electronic Science and
Technology of China (UESTC), Chengdu, China, in
2012. From October 2009 to March 2012, with the
financial supported from the China scholarship coun-
cil (CSC) and the global center of education (ECOE)
of Tohoku University, he joined the wireless signal
processing and network laboratory (Prof. Fumiyuki
Adachi laboratory), Department of Communications
Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, To-
hoku University as for research assistant as well as postdoctoral research fel-
low, respectively. From September 2012 to March 2014, he was supported by
Japan society for the promotion of science (JSPS) fellowship as postdoctoral
research fellow at same laboratory. From April 2014 to October 2015, he was
an Assistant Professor in Department of Electronics and Information System,
Akita Prefectural University. Since November 2015, he has been a professor
with Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications (NUPT), Nanjing,
China. He is currently engaged in research of deep learning, compressive
sensing and advanced wireless techniques. He is a senior member of Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Dr. Gui has been Editor
for Security and Communication Networks (2012–2016), editor of IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology (2017–) and KSII Transactions on
Internet and Information System (2017–). He received several best paper
awards such as CSPS2018, ICNC2018, ICC2017, ICC2014 and VTC2014-
Spring. He was also selected as for Jiangsu Special Appointed Professor,
Jiangsu High-level Innovation and Entrepreneurial Talent and Nanjing Youth
Award.
12
Yang Cao is currently a graduate student in the
School of Information and Communication Engi-
neering at Dalian University of Technology, China.
She received the B.S. degree from HeFei University
of Technology, China.
Her current research interests include interference
alignment, physical layer security, wireless energy
harvesting, and resource allocation.
Shun Zhang received the B.S. degree in com-
munication engineering from Shandong University,
Jinan, China, in 2007 and the Ph.D. degree in
communications and signal processing from Xidian
University, Xi’an, China, in 2013. He is currently
with the State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services
Networks, Xidian University. His research interests
include MIMO-OFDM systems, relay networks, and
detection and parameter estimation theory.
Yunfei Chen (S’02-M’06-SM’10) received his B.E.
and M.E. degrees in electronics engineering from
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, P.R.China,
in 1998 and 2001, respectively. He received his
Ph.D. degree from the University of Alberta in 2006.
He is currently working as an Associate Professor
at the University of Warwick, U.K. His research
interests include wireless communications, cognitive
radios, wireless relaying and energy harvesting.
Hikmet Sari (F’95) is currently Professor of Nan-
jing University of Posts and Telecommunications
(NUPT), and also Chief Scientist of Sequans Com-
munications, a leading developer and supplier of
LTE chipset solutions. He received his Engineering
Degree and Ph.D. from the ENST, Paris, France,
and the post-doctoral Habilitation degree from the
University of Paris-Sud, Orsay. Prior to his current
positions, he held various research and management
positions in industry including Philips Research Lab-
oratories, SAT, Alcatel, Pacific Broadband Commu-
nications, and Juniper Networks. His distinctions include the IEEE Fellow
Grade (1995), the Andre Blondel Medal (also in 1995), the Edwin H.
Armstrong Achievement Award in 2003, the Harold Sobol Award in 2012,
as well as election to Academia Europaea (the Academy of Europe) and to
the Science Academy of Turkey in 2012.
Prof. Sari has served as an Editor of the IEEE Transactions on Com-
munications (1987-1981), a Guest Editor of the European Transactions on
Telecommunications (1993) and of the IEEE JSAC (1999), and an Associate
Editor of the IEEE Communications Letters (1999-2002). He served as a
Distinguished Lecturer of the IEEE Communications Society in 2001-2006,
as a member of the IEEE Fellow Evaluation Committee in 2002-2007, and
as a member of the Awards Committee in 2005-2007.
Prof. Sari was Chair of the Communication Theory Symposium of ICC
2002 (New York), Technical Program Chair of ICC 2004 (Paris), Vice General
Chair of ICC 2006 (Istanbul), General Chair of PIMRC 2010 (Istanbul),
General Chair of WCNC 2012 (Paris), Executive Chair of WCNC 2014
(Istanbul), General Chair of ICUWB 2014 (Paris), General Co-Chair of
IEEE BlackSeaCom 2015 (Constanta, Romania), Technical Program Chair of
EuCNC 2015 (Paris), and Executive Co-Chair of ICC 2016 (Kuala Lumpur).
He also chaired the Globecom and ICC Technical Content (GITC) Committee
during the period of 2010 C 2011, and he was Vice President for Conferences
of the IEEE Communications Society during 2014 C 2015. Currently, he is
serving as General Co-Chair of ATC 2016 (Hanoi, Vietnam), Executive Chair
of ICC 2017 (Paris), and General Chair of PIMRC 2018 (Istanbul).
